State-owned forest enterprises (SOFEs) in northeast China and Inner Mongolia play important roles both in timber production and in the maintenance of ecological security. However, since the late 1970s, forest resource and economic crises have seriously restricted these functions. Based on a theoretical and an empirical analysis of the harvest and investment behavior of the SOFEs, we examined the effects of forest policies and the socioeconomic conditions on the behavioral choices of the SOFEs. Both the extent to which SOFE supervising authorities emphasized improvement of forest resources in their annual evaluations and the increases in expenses necessary to manage SOFEs had significant impacts on harvest and investment decisions as well as development of forest resources. Promoting the management and utilization of non-timber resources, as well as reforms to increase the efficiency of forest protection and management, have reduced timber harvests as intended, which in turn has increased investment and improved forest resources. The effects have been relatively small, however. In contrast, reforms aimed at timber harvest and afforestation activities actually contributed to increasing the timber harvest, which affected the development of the forest resources negatively.
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Jiang et al. Since the late 1970s, a number of policy adjustments have been made to ease the pressure on the SOFEs. In 1978, a reform gave the SOFE managers more leeway to make decisions and increased their share of the profits (Zhang 1998), but the supervising authorities still retained tight control. These authorities approved all production plans and assessed the achievements of the SOFEs.
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In 1988 the supervising authorities started to implement a -contract managementresponsibility system‖ to help reduce some of the operating costs of the SOFEs, but it unfortunately also increased exploitation of the forests in the region (Cao 2000) . The reforms since 1992 have focused on introducing market mechanisms to the management of state-owned forests (SFA 2010) . One of the strategies was to create market-oriented -modern forest enterprises.‖ To this end, four large-scale forest companies were established in northeast China and Inner Mongolia between 1992 and 1996.
For a long time after the reforms started, the SOFEs were obligated to sell part of their timber to the state at prices pre-determined by the government. In 1986 and 1990, the government adjusted its purchase prices for timber and increased the share of timber that the SOFEs were allowed to sell at market prices. Although the tax burden of the SOFEs had declined since the 1980s, the effects of the taxation relief only partly offset the continuously increasing fees that the SOFEs had to pay (Jiang 2006) .
It is worth mentioning that the Natural Forest Protection Program (NFPP), one of the key national forestry programs, has had a considerable impact on the SOFEs in northeast China and Inner Mongolia. The NFPP was started in 1998 and has substantially reduced the amount of (table 2) . The most significant reduction in the share of timber production forests occurred in the late 1990s as part of the NFPP. Furthermore, the growing stock of timber in mature forests decreased from 71 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 2008 of the total timber stock in the timber production forests (table 3). Significant reduction of the amount of timber in mature forests that could be harvested severely affected the sustainability of forest management. When the SOFE survey (reported below) was conducted, leaders of many of the enterprises admitted that current harvest levels could not be sustained for long. When SOFE managers make decisions, they must consider both their own interests and the goals assigned by the supervising authorities. At present, they sign annual contracts with the supervising authorities, which specify both economic and forest resource targets. Obviously, one year is much too short, relative to the production cycle of timber, to allow the SOFEs leaders to make reasonable long-term sustainable management plans. The priority is the economic targets specified in the contracts because achieving these targets dominates the supervising authorities' evaluation of the SOFEs.
The annual assessment of the SOFEs, financial subsidies, and various regulations are the main instruments used by the forestry authorities to control and manage the SOFEs. It seems obvious that the supervising authorities would maximize social welfare and adopt policies and assessment criteria that sufficiently spur SOFE leaders to manage their forests sustainably.
However, serious information asymmetry exists between the SOFEs and the supervising authorities, partly due to the large area managed by each SOFE (Xu and Ran 2004) . 1 This information asymmetry leads forestry authorities to focus more on the short-term economic performance of the SOFEs, which is easier to evaluate and is more closely related to the forestry 1 The average area managed by each SOFE is about 200,000 hectares.
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authorities' self interests. Consequently, the SOFEs often sacrifice safeguarding forest resources because sale of timber is the main source of income in pursuing profit targets.
The purpose of this study is to examine the factors influencing the timber harvest, forest management investment behavior, and the forest resource change of SOFEs. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a theoretical analysis of the behavior of SOFEs. Sections 2-4 describe the model specification, our survey data, and the results of the empirical analysis, respectively. The fifth section outlines the conclusions.
Theoretical Analysis of the Behavior of State-Owned Forest Enterprises
Timber harvest and forest management decisions at the SOFE level are made annually.
The decisionmakers at typical SOFEs are concerned with two attributes of the outcome of their decisions: the financial result in the current year and the state of the forest at the end of the year.
The financial result of a SOFE is determined by the profits from timber production and forest management, the profits from non-forestry activities (including subsidies from the government), and the SOFE's fixed costs.
The last two components are treated as exogenous variables in the following analysis.
Forestry profits refer to the revenue of timber harvest net of the harvest cost and costs of forest management activities. We assume that forest regeneration takes place immediately after an area of forest is harvested. Thus, regeneration cost is modeled as a function of the harvest volume.
The cost of all other forest management activities is represented by a separate decision variable. The state of the forest is described by the growing stock of timber. The preferences of the decisionmaker are described using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The decision problem is modeled as:
subject to: Large portions of the forests in northeast China are middle-aged or young stands. The SOFEs in this region own very few old-growth forests. Timber harvest commonly starts in the oldest and most easily accessible stands, where trees are larger and the stocking level is higher than in younger stands. As the harvest volume increases, younger and younger stands are harvested, implying that both the marginal harvest cost and the marginal regeneration cost associated with each harvested cubic meter of timber increase with the harvest volume. In profit function (1b), we capture these effects by assuming that
is an increasing and strictly convex function of the harvest volume h, namely, 0 ) , (
The productivity of timber harvest and regeneration efforts h r is included in the cost
to reflect the effect of rationalization of timber harvest and regeneration operations on the cost of the operation. This variable is defined in such a way that, given an arbitrary harvest volume, a larger value of h r leads to a lower harvest and regeneration cost, in
. Further, we assume that the economic gain (in terms of cost reduction) of rationalization increases as the harvest level increases, which means that 0 ) ,
When modeling the growing stock of timber at the end of the year, we assume that timber harvest takes place at the beginning of the year. The growth function ) ( 0 h Q g  tells us how large a growing timber stock of ) ( 0 h Q  will become in one year, when it is managed ideally and there is no damage or loss due to wildfire or pest outbreak, for example. In other words,
 is the maximum stock we will have one year later, if the current timber stock is )
 is an increasing and concave function of
The function ) , ( I r S m refers to the percentage of the potential growth that is actually realized. Presumably, a larger investment leads to more intensive management of the existing stands, which in turn will result in a higher rate of realization of the potential growth. Moreover, the marginal effect of increasing management intensity on timber growth usually becomes smaller when the management intensity grows higher. Based on these arguments, we assume the following properties of the function
In the same way that we model the effect of rationalization on harvest and regeneration cost, we include a variable . That is, rationalization of the management of existing stands will increase the growth of the stands, but the marginal effect is decreasing as the investment increases.
The fixed costs of a SOFE here refer to expenditures for retirement pensions and employee (including their families) benefits, such as medical care, education, etc. We include these costs in the decision model as an exogenous variable because the SOFEs have limited means of controlling these costs.
Substituting equations (1b) and (1c) into objective function (1a), and assuming that an interior optimal solution exists, the decision model (1a) to (1e) can be analyzed as an unconstrained optimization problem. At the optimum, the partial derivatives of the objective function with respect to the decision variables should be equal to zero. That is:
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Expanding the partial derivatives, and after some simplifications, the first-order conditions for the optimal solution can be expressed as:
Equation (2a) implies that if the optimal harvest volume is greater than zero, then the marginal profit of harvesting is greater than zero, in other words, [ ( , ) (2a) and (2b) yields the following equations:
g S dp 
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where:
The signs of A, B, C, and D are determined by the properties of the functions 
Equations (3a) and (3b) reduce to:
Solving these two equations yields:
In a similar way, we can examine the other parameters' effects on the harvest and investment behavior, as well as the effect on the growing stock of timber at the end of the year.
The results of the comparative statics analysis are summarized in table 4. Based on the results of the theoretical analysis, we can draw the following conclusions.
 An increase in the initial growing stock of timber causes a SOFE to increase both its timber harvest and investment in forest management. The net effect of these changes on the growing stock of timber at the end of the year is positive.
 If the supervising authority increases its emphasis on the financial result of the SOFEs in their annual evaluation, the SOFEs will increase timber harvest and reduce investment in forest management. Accordingly, the growing stock of timber at the end of the year will be smaller.
If the supervising authority places a greater weight on forest resource development, the SOFEs will decrease timber harvest and increase investment in forest management, which will results in a larger growing stock of timber at the end of the year.
 Reforms that efficiently reduce harvests and regeneration costs will spur the SOFEs to invest more in forest management. The effects of such reforms on timber harvest and on the development of the forest resources are undetermined.
 The impact of reforms-intended to increase the productivity of forest management efforts-on timber harvest, investment, and the development of the forest resources are undetermined.
 An increase in non-forestry income will reduce the timber harvest and increase investment in forest management. This will result in a larger growing stock of timber at the end of the year. In contrast, an increase in fixed costs will increase the timber harvest and reduce investment in forest management, and thus result in a smaller growing stock of timber at the end of the year.
o Following an increase in timber price, the SOFEs will increase investment in forest management, but impacts on the harvest and on the development of forest resources are ambiguous.
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Empirical Model Specification
Based on the results of the theoretical analysis, the econometric models are:
ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln In the survey data, investment in forest management activities is included in the fixed assets investment. Therefore, we use the fixed assets investment of the SOFEs as a proxy for total investment in forest management.
In the theoretical analysis, we assumed that the SOFE decisionmakers maximize their utility, which is a function of current profits and the growing stock of timber at the end of each year. In reality, the leadership of each SOFE is responsible to its supervising authority, which evaluates the SOFE's performance, using a number of criteria, including profit and the improvement of forest resources.
The variable -incentive for forest protection‖ refers to the weight a supervising authority assigns in the annual contract to how well a SOFE improves forest resources. Accordingly, an increase in the -incentive for forest protection‖ should reduce the timber harvest and increase the investment in forest protection and management, and thus increase the growing stock of timber at the end of the year.
Non-forestland is the combination of agricultural land, pastures, and land used for miscellaneous purposes. This variable is used as a proxy for the non-forestry income of the SOFEs. According to Xu et al. (2006) , the management and utilization of non-timber products by the SOFEs promoted the development of this tertiary industry and increased the income of the SOFEs and their workers. Furthermore, the management and utilization of non-timber resources created jobs and reduced the degree of dependence on forest resources.
The most important non-timber resource utilizations are crop growing, livestock farming, and collecting and processing non-timber forest products, such as mushrooms, fungi, herbs, and wild vegetables. Therefore, the area of non-forestland provides a reasonable indication of the scale of the non-timber resource utilization.
In the empirical analysis, we used two variables to describe the fixed costs of the SOFEs. The variable -tax and fees‖ refers to the sum of the taxes and fees a SOFE pays in one year in proportion to the gross revenue of the SOFE. The second variable, -social burden,‖ refers to the number of retired workers and school and hospital staff hired by each SOFE.
The variable -harvest and afforestation reform‖ refers to the number of years elapsed since a SOFE reformed the organization and implementation of its harvest and afforestation activities. Similarly, the variable -forest protection and management reform‖ refers to the number of years elapsed since a SOFE reformed the organization and implementation of forest protection and management activities. These reforms are important means for the SOFEs to increase productivity of timber harvest and afforestation, as well as forest protection efforts.
Observations of the changes in efficiency resulting from the reforms are not available, however. Presumably, it takes time to achieve the maximum effects of the reforms. We use the time Environment for Development Jiang et al.
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elapsed since a SOFE started the reforms as proxy for the extent of rationalization of afforestation and forest protection activities.
Data
We estimated the empirical models with data for all 75 SOFEs in Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (see table 6 Descriptive statistics of the data are presented in table 7. 
Estimation Results
The sample is a panel data set. In general, panel data can be analyzed using three types of models: pooled regression models, random effects regression models, and fixed effects regression models. In our analysis, we first compared the pooled regression model and random effects regression model using the F-test. The result showed that the random effects model was superior to the pooled model. Next, we used the Hausman test to compare the random effects model with fixed effect model, and found that the fixed effects model was more effective.
Finally, we conducted a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test to the fixed effect model and found that we could not reject the correlation assumption among the sample cross-section.
Therefore, we estimated the models with the feasible generalized least squares considering the correlation.
Because the generalized least squares estimation controlling the heteroskedasticity and correlation requires balanced data, we removed one of the SOFEs in Jilin Province, which was established in 1990, and estimated the models using 1,850 observations. In order to solve the endogeneity problem, we lagged the independent variables, so the actual number of observations used in the model estimation was 1,776. The estimation results are presented in table 8. Notes: * indicates significant at 10% level, ** indicates significant at 5% level, and *** indicates significant at 1% level. Z value is in parentheses.
The estimation results strongly support the results of the theoretical analysis. The empirical results show that an increase in the weight assigned by the supervising authorities to forest resource improvement will reduce timber harvest and increase the investment in forest protection and management of the SOFE, as the theoretical analysis suggested. The estimation also shows that the effects on both the harvest volume and the investment are large. If the weight of forest resource improvement increases by 1 percent in a contract signed by the supervising authorities and the SOFE, the harvest volume will decrease by 1.65 percent, while the investment will increase by 8.98 percent. Increasing the weight of forest resource improvement has a positive effect on change in the growing stock of timber over time, but the effect is not statistically significant.
The forest protection and management reform had a positive impact on investment, but a negative influence on the harvest volume. Both effects are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The reform also had a positive effect on change in the growing stock of timber, but the effect is statistically insignificant. The result suggests that the reform focusing on the implementation of forest protection activities started to show effects on the harvest and investment rather quickly, but it will take longer time before we can observe any significant impact of the reform on the development of forest resources over time.
The afforestation reform had a positive impact on the harvest volume and a negative impact on the change in the growing stock of timber. This reform had a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect on the fixed assets investment. The result indicates that the afforestation reform can effectively reduce regeneration costs. All other things the same, the reduction in regeneration costs increases the profits from harvesting and regenerating the forest, and therefore causes the harvest level to increase. Intuitively, the afforestation reform should lead to more forests being successfully established, which would have a positive effect on the development of the growing stock of timber.
In this study, we regressed the growing stock of timber at the end of each year against the growing stock of timber at the beginning of the year, in addition to the other explanatory variables. This means that, in our model, forests established in previous years do not affect the growing stock of timber at the end of the current year. These forests are accounted for in the growing stock of timber at the beginning of the year. Because the growing stock of timber in the newly established forests is very low, the positive effect of the regeneration reform on the growing stock of timber is negligible. Therefore, in our model, the afforestation reform affects the growing stock of timber mainly through its effects on harvest, which explains the negative effect of the reform on the development of the growing stock of timber.
An increase in the social burden of a SOFE will increase its harvest volume and have a negative effect on the development of the forest resources. In relation to the theoretical model, an increase in the social burden corresponds to an increase in the fixed costs of the SOFE. Thus, with respect to the effect on timber harvest and the development of forest resources, the empirical result is consistent with the result of the theoretical analysis. What may appear surprising is the positive effect of social burden on the fixed assets investment. The reason for this positive effect is probably due to the fact that the fixed assets investment included those investments aimed at providing social services, whereas the theoretical model examined the effect on investment in forest protection and management. If the social burden increased by 10 percent, the harvest volume would increase by 4.36 percent; at the same time, the investment would increase by 0.76 percent. The effect on the forest resources stock is small.
As expected, an increase in the tax and fees will significantly increase the harvest volume; at the same time, it will affect the investment and the development of the forest resource negatively, although the later two effects were statistically not significant. The estimated parameters show that a 10 percent increase in the tax and fees will cause a 8.54 percent increase of harvest volume.
An increase in the area of non-forestland would cause the harvest volume to decrease, but had a positive effect on the investment and on the development of the forest resources. Since a larger area of non-forestland implies a higher non-forestry income, this result is consistent with our theoretical result. The effects of the area of non-forestland are small, however. Following a 10 percent increase in the area of non-forestland, the harvest volume would decrease by 0.11 percent, the fixed assets investment would increase by 0.14 percent, and the growing stock of timber at the end of the year would increase by only 0.01 percent.
Increases in timber price had positive effects on the harvest volume and the fixed assets investment. The estimation result showed that if the timber price rose by 10 percent, the harvest volume would increase by 1.46 percent and the fixed assets investment would increase by 3.39
percent. An increase in timber price would affect the development of the forest resources positively, but the effect is statistically not significant.
The growing stock of timber has significant and positive effects on the harvest volume and the fixed assets investment, as well as on the development of the forest resources. If the growing stock of timber at the beginning of a year increases by 10 percent, the harvest volume and the fixed assets investment in the same year to would increase by 6.89 percent and 4.28 percent, respectively, and the growing stock of timber at the end of the year would increase by 9.85 percent.
Conclusions
An important conclusion we can draw from the results of this study is that a number of policy measures can effectively change the managerial behavior, as well as the development of forest resources, of the SOFEs. Specifically, the supervising authorities exercise considerable influence on the harvest and investment decisions of SOFEs by how they weight specific 
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elements in the annual SOFE evaluations. By assigning a greater weight to forest resource improvement, the supervising authorities can induce the SOFEs to significantly reduce the harvest level and increase investment. Likewise, reduction of taxes and fees, as well as policy measures that reduce the social burden of the SOFEs, can significantly reduce the harvest level.
These measures will have positive effects on the development of forest resources.
A second conclusion is that the reforms within the SOFEs have had relatively few effects on harvest and investment decisions, and on development of the forest resources. The reforms have been aimed at increasing the productivity of timber harvest and forest management (including afforestation and forest protection) efforts. When carrying out these reforms, the SOFEs were not able to make any significant adjustment in the number of employees or the level of social services they provide. The potential of rationalization through such reforms is therefore limited.
A third conclusion is that the strategy of promoting non-timber resource businesses (such as crop growing, livestock farming, etc.) has had a positive effect on the development of the forest resources, although the effect has been small thus far. 
